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Abstract
The evolution of resource specialism and generalism has attractedwidespread inter-
est. Evolutionary drivers affecting niche differentiation and resource specialization
have focused on the role of trade-offs. Here, however, we explore how the role of
cooperation, mediated through altruistic behaviors, and classic resource–consumer
dynamics can influence the evolution of resource utilization. Using an evolutionary
invasion approach, we investigate how critical thresholds in levels of altruism are
needed for resource specialization to arise and be maintained. Differences between
complementary (essential) and substitutable resources affect the evolution of re-
source generalists. The strength of resource preferences coupled with the levels of
altruism are predicted to influence the evolution of generalism. Coupling appro-
priate evolutionary game and ecological dynamics lead to novel expectations in the
feedbacks between social behaviors and population dynamics for understanding
classic ecological problems.
Introduction
Defining the fundamental, and more importantly, the real-
ized niche of species is an ecological problem that continues
to be the focus of considerable effort. As is widely appreci-
ated, Hutchinson (1957) defined an ecological niche as a n-
dimensional hypervolume that delimits patterns of resource
utilization and exploitation along a set of ecological axes.
This theory of niches has generally been developed from the
basis that species interact and compete for shared essential re-
sources. The outcome of this interspecific competition is well
known: species coexistence is not expected unless the interac-
tion amongst conspecifics outweighs the interaction amongst
heterospecifics and the number of species that co-occur can-
not exceed the number of resources.While arguably tautolog-
ical (May 1973), Levin (1970) and others have extended this
idea to consider broader limiting factors (rather than simply
focusing on resources) and reached a more generic predic-
tion: coexistence is not possible if the number of species are
limited by less than the equivalent number of limiting factors.
In spite of caveats on the extent of resource use by consumers,
limiting factors act to define niche axes and the niche width
defines the degree of variability in resource utilization by a
species: narrow niche widths and hence small variation in re-
sources used is expected to correlate with resource specialism
while species with broad niche widths (large variation) are
resource generalists (Roughgarden 1972).
Determining the evolution of specialists or generalists has
focused primarily on the assessment of fitness on multi-
ple resources. Levins (1962, 1968) argued that while fitness
on multiple resources is generally negatively correlated—
performance on one resource occurs at a cost of performance
on a second resource—the shape of this trade-off is impor-
tant. The expectation is that consumers are generalists when
equally well adapted to multiple resources and the fitness is
concave outwards such that small changes in diet have small
incremental changes on fitness. In contrast, consumers are
expected to be specialists if the fitness function is concave
inwards and small changes in resource use have large fitness
consequences. As noted, fundamental to resource specializa-
tion is this necessity for trade-offs (Futuyma and Moreno
1988). Phenotypic trait trade-offs are, therefore, putatively
associated with negative genetic covariance (e.g., Leroi et al.
1994). However, the evolution of specialization might not
necessarily require negative genetic correlations (Fry 1996;
Whitlock 1996). Specialization can be favored if genotypes
that are under positive selection on one resource are un-
der weaker positive selection or are neutral on alternative
resources (Fry 1996; Dykhuizen and Dean 2004). Levins’ fit-
ness set approach further assumes that preferences (if not
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performance) for different resources is equal. This idea of
diet breadth has been the focus of considerable work as the
driver of generalism and specialism (e.g., MacArthur and Pi-
anka 1966; Schoener 1974; Abrams 2006). Resources have
been widely classified into different types: substitutable, es-
sential, complementary, switching, or antagonistic (Tilman
1982) and have important implications for the structure of
ecological communities. Explicit consideration of resource
types is known to influence competition (Leon and Tump-
son 1975); for example, essential resources affect the out-
come of interspecific competition by altering the strength of
species interactions (Abrams 1987). These diet classifications
clearly have the potential to influence the evolution of re-
source utilization patterns. Furthermore, additional ecologi-
cal attributes, in particular the role of environmental hetero-
geneity, are known to affect species coexistence (Armstrong
and McGehee 1980) and coupled with diet allow alternative
conditions for the maintenance of specialism and generalism
to be derived (Wilson and Yoshimura 1994; Abrams 2007;
Debarre and Gandon 2010).
Processes that affect the maintenance of polymorphisms
will have an influence on the patterns of resource utiliza-
tion. Haldane (1931, 1932) argues that intense competition
among individuals will lead to a variable response to the en-
vironment rather than a higher average response and it is
well known that this affects the conditions for the mainte-
nance of polymorphisms (tacitly assumed to be generalists).
Furthermore, the maintenance of polymorphism is deter-
mined by local population structures, heterozygote advan-
tage, and mutation-selection balance (Karlin and Campbell
1981;Maynard–Smith1998). For instance, instability ofniche
polymorphism (and hence the evolution of specialists) is ex-
pected under population structures associated with hard se-
lection (selection dependent only on gene frequencies) as
particular genotypes are favored and fixed in a population.
Local population structure and soft selection (where density
and frequency-dependent selection for genotypes operates)
can act to maintain genetic variation (Wilson and Turelli
1986) and promote generalism.
The ability to access resources requires appropriate mor-
phological and physiological adaptations (Futuyma and
Moreno 1988). These properties influence an organism’s abil-
ity to select appropriate habitats and/or resources and, conse-
quently affect nichewidth. The ability to access resourcesmay
require additional behavioral adaptations such as cooperative
help from conspecifics. Broadly, such cooperative actions are
behaviors that confer a benefit to an individual at a cost to
another (Trivers 1985). In succinct style, Haldane (1932; pp.
207–210) illustrates how cooperation in groupsmight spread
provided most individuals in a group behave altruistically.
Hamilton (1963) extended this argument to show that the
behavioral diversity observed among species, as well as mor-
phological adaptations, are both products of evolution, and
that this evolution can arise through altruistic behaviors such
that a behavior spreads if the fitness gain is at least twice the
loss. However, the consequences of this class of behaviors on
the evolution of resource specialism are poorly understood
even though collective altruistic behaviors are implicated in
the successful exploitation of resources (Dugatkin 1997). For
example, female bark beetles (Dendroctonus montanus) use
aggregation pheromones to call in conspecifics to overcome
tree defenses (Wyatt 2003). As female density increases, in-
dividuals have higher reproductive successes in terms of pu-
pae per attack (until the effects of intraspecifc competition
increase in severity) (Raffa and Berryman 1983; Berryman
et al. 1985). Cooperative actions have also been implicated
in the capture of prey by social spiders (Whitehouse and
Lubin 2005). The social spider, Anelosimus eximius, builds
communal webs and group foraging allows capture of prey
of increasing size. This offsets the decline in the number of
prey caught per individual as web size and hence colony size
increases. Maximum resource intake occurs at intermediate
spider densities (Yip et al. 2008). Individual success rates in
lion foraging are also correlated with ecological attributes
such as prey type and group structure (Scheel and Packer
1991). Groups of lions have higher success foraging than in-
dividuals (Dugatkin 1997) but this is open to exploitation by
lions that refrain to engage in specific hunting bouts (Scheel
and Packer 1991). The exploitation of hosts by opportunistic
pathogenic bacteria, such as Bacillus thuringiensis, involves
sharing the exploits of toxin production from multiple indi-
viduals as single individuals are incapable of overcoming host
defenses. The exploitation of toxin producers by cheats (non-
toxin producing strains) has consequences for pathogen vir-
ulence (Raymond et al. 2007, 2009), host-pathogen epidemi-
ology (Bonsall 2010) and the evolution of pathogen strain
specificity (Berry et al., unpubl. ms.).
While the evolutionary biology of social interactions is
well established (see Bourke 2011 for a recent overview),
the broader ecological outcome of altruistic behaviors on
the effects of interspecific competition and community orga-
nization are unclear. Here, our aim is to redress this and
explore the consequence of altruism on the evolution of
resource specialization and generalism. The approach we
develop combines an evolutionary game with ecological
dynamics: by coupling replicator dynamics (describing the
proportion of altruists in a consumer population) with eco-
logical resource–consumer dynamics, we aim to explore how
greater access to resources manifest through altruistic acts
can influence the evolution of resource specialization and
generalism. Importantly, an evolutionary invasion approach
is used to determine conditions that favor the origin over
the maintenance of specialists and generalists by exploring
the expected outcome of different resource utilization pat-
terns when altruism operates to increase resource acquisition
rate. In the next section, we begin by introducing the model
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framework, laying out the evolutionary dynamics of altru-
ism, and the ecological dynamics of the resource–consumer
interaction. We show how different levels of altruism cou-
pledwith patterns in resource utilization (exclusive resources,
complementary resources, or essential resources) can influ-
ence the evolution of specialism and generalism highlighting
the importance of linking evolutionary games to ecological
dynamics.
Mathematical Model and Analysis
Model outline
Dynamics of altruism
We follow Trivers (1985) and define altruism in terms of so-
cial behaviors that confers a benefit with a cost. In doing this,
we avoid the necessity to model more complex social interac-
tions involving kin interactions and different levels of related-
ness.We extend a hawk-dove game (Maynard–Smith 1982) to
account for the utilization of resources by two strategies (co-
operative [C] and selfish [S]). This is a useful way to explore
evolutionary games that involve strategies that either com-
pletely monopolise a resource (selfish individuals—hawks)
compared to those that cooperate and share a resource (coop-
erative individuals—doves). The proportion of altruists (x)
in a consumer population of sizeM is determined from this
evolutionary game and the appropriate cost–benefit (payoff)
matrix V when two strategies (1 and 2) meet is then defined
as (Maynard–Smith 1982):
V =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
C2 S2
C1
R
2
(1 − η)R
S1 ηR
(R − ν)
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (1)
Here, R is the fixed strategy payoff, η is the probability
that selfish individuals monopolize the resource and ν is the
cost of squabbling over resource. The change in the propor-
tion of altruists (x) through time is given by the following
(replicator) equation:
dx
dt
= x(t)
[
x(t)
R
2
+ (1 − η)R(1 − x(t)) − φ
]
, (2)
where φ is the average population strategy:
φ = x(t)
[
x(t)
R
2
+ (1 − η)R(1 − x(t))
]
+ (1 − x(t))
[
x(t)Rη + R − ν
2
(1 − x(t))
]
.
(3)
Ecological dynamics of specialists
The general ecological dynamics for a resource (N)—
consumer (M) interaction describe the population-level con-
sequences when the consumer can feed on a number of dif-
ferent resources. This sort of framework allows the ecological
dynamics of specialism to be explore and mathematically is
described by:
dNi
dt
= ri Ni (t)
[
1 − Ni (t)
Ki
]
− f (βi , xi )Ni (t)M(t) (4)
dM
dt
=
n∑
i=1
f (βi , xi )Ni (t)M(t) − μM(t), (5)
where ri is the growth rate of the ith resource, Ki is the
carrying capacity of the ith resource,μ is the consumer death
rate, and f (β i , xi) is the resource utilization function (see
below).
Linking evolutionary and ecological dynamics
Welink the evolutionary andecological dynamics through the
resource utilization function (f (β i , xi)). A consumer’s ability
to sequester and utilize a resource is dependent on two pro-
cesses: the resource uptake process (β i) and the proportion
of consumers that act altruistically (xi) on the ith resource.
These resource utilization functions can be described in three
general ways: concave, linear, or convex:
f (βi , xi ) = βi xi
1 + ai xi (6)
f (βi , xi ) = βi xi (7)
f (βi , xi ) = exp(βi xi ), (8)
where β i is the resource consumption rate, ai is a constant,
and βiai determines the asymptote associated with the concave
expression (Equation [6]). These functions have different
cost implications (based on the shape of the function) for
the effects of altruism when consumers feed on a single ver-
sus multiple resources. Furthermore, while the proportion
of altruisms determine the resource utilization function, it
is important to note that the size of the resource (Ni) or
consumer (M) populations do not feedback directly to affect
the proportion of altruists. By making this assumption, we
focus on the evolution of specialism and generalism and not
on the effects of population size on the evolution of altru-
ism. Belowwe explore both the biological implications of our
chosen resource functions (Equations [6–8]) and the poten-
tial for coexistence amongst specialists with these resource
utilization strategies.
Ecological dynamics of generalists
The evolution of generalism is explored on resources that
differ in their impact on consumerpopulations: resources can
be directly substitutable or complementary (essential) (Leon
and Tumpson 1975; Tilman 1982). The ecological effects of
these different types of resources have been well developed
c© 2012 The Authors. Ecology and Evolution published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 517
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but the consequences of social behaviors on the potential
for the evolution of generalist strategies have not previously
been considered. The population dynamics of consumers on
resources that are entirely substitutable are described by:
dM
dt
=
n∑
i=1
f (βi , xi )qi Ni (t)M(t) − μM(t), (9)
where qi is the preference for the ith resource and resources
are (linearly) substitutable—that is as preference for one re-
source goes down the preference for a second resource in-
crease (and both resources have equal effects on population
growth).
On complementary (essential) resources (at least), two re-
sources are required for growth. However, while both re-
sources are consumed (hence generalism)onlyone, the essen-
tial limiting resource, determines population growth (Leon
and Tumpson 1975). To explore the evolution of general-
ism on complementary resources, consumption of these re-
sources must differ among strategies. If competition is for
the same complementary resource then this is primarily evo-
lution of specialism (see above). The dynamics of consumers
on complementary resources are determined by:
dM
dt
= min
k
[ f (βki , xk)qki Nk(t)]M(t) − μM(t), (10)
wheremink[f (βki , xk)qkiNk(t)] is theminimization function
across i resources and qki is the consumption rate of the ith
resource by the kth strategy.
Analysis
The analysis of the model proceeds by coupling the
evolutionary game (Equation [1]) and the appropriate
resource–consumer interaction (Equations [4] and [5] for
specialists, Equations [4] and [9] for generalists on substi-
tutable resources, and Equations [4] and [10] for generalists
on complementary resources), from which an evolutionary
invasion approach can be used to explore both the origins
and maintenance of specialism and generalism under dif-
ferent levels of altruism. We derive evolutionary invasion
matrices under the different assumptions associated with the
resource–consumer dynamics and obtain the invasion crite-
ria under a weak selection limit (see Supporting informa-
tion). We relax this weak selection assumption and explore
the conditions for coexistence of different resource specialist
strategies and hence the factors affecting the maintenance of
polymorphisms. By evaluating the reciprocal invasion con-
ditions under the different resource responses (Equations
[6–8]) where mutations are finite (and sometimes small), we
determine when alternative strategies will evolve and replace
existing strategies or promote coexistence.
Results
Evolution of resource specialization
A strategy is a specialist strategy if it only has access to a single
limiting resource. Under linear resource consumption rate
(f (β i , x)= β ixi), the population-level growth of a novel rare
specialist consumer strategy (xi , Mi) defines the success of
the strategy (see Supporting information). A novel consumer
strategy specializing on a single resource (N∗) will invade if
its overall net growth rate is greater than zero (see Supporting
information) and this occurs if both the following inequalities
hold:
1
2
(R(2η − 1) + ν(xi − 1))(xi − 1) > 0 (11)
xiβi N
∗ > μ. (12)
The first criterion states that specialization is favored pro-
vided the strategy for altruism grows. Within the invading
strategy, a proportion of individuals must act altruistically
to sequester the necessary level of resource. The second cri-
terion is a standard ecological expectation that requires that
specialization is favored if the consumer’s resource consump-
tion rate exceeds the consumer death rate. Both evolutionary
and ecological processes have to operate to allow the evolu-
tion of resource specialization.
Evolution of specialism
Evolutionary invasion contours for the evolution of special-
ists on a single resource as a function of the costs associated
with squabbling for the resource (ν) and the proportion of
altruistic individuals are shown in Figure 1. These invasion
contours show a number of key features associated with this
evolution of resource specialization. First, there is a threshold
value of altruism below which specialization on a resource
cannot occur. This threshold has to bemuch greater than zero
and suggests that specialism cannot occur if selfishness pre-
vails. Second, altruism is expectedwhen (fromEquation [1]):
η >
1
2
(13)
η <
1
2
+ ν
2R
. (14)
In populations comprised principally of selfish individu-
als, altruism occurs if η < 12 + ν2R and selfishness is not an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Similarly, altruism is not
an ESS as selfish strategies spread when η > 12 . These criteria
lead to a bounded region in which altruism is expected to
occur—hence, the U-shaped pattern in Figure 1. Finally, in-
creasing thepayoff andhence reducing thedifferencebetween
the costs of squabbling and the cost/benefits associated with
a strategy restricts the region of parameter space in which
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Figure 1. Invasion contours for specialists as a
function of costs associated with squabbling
(ν) for a resource and the proportion of
altruists in a strategy (x). Evolution of
specialists occurs inside the boundaries.
Threshold levels of altruism above which
specialization evolves are dependent on
increasing levels of payoff reward (R).
specialization evolves (this is similar to the outcome associ-
ated with a hawk-dove game) as η > 12 + ν2R ≈ η > 12 .
Ecological coexistence of specialists
Determining the potential for coexistence of specialists and
hence the maintenance of polymorphisms requires evaluat-
ing the mutual invasion conditions of phenotypic strategies
from rare. These conditions are determined from the strat-
egy invasion matrix and the resulting fitness function (see
Supporting information). The effects of the resource uti-
lization (f (β i , xi)) function can affect the patterns of coex-
istence and evolution (Equations [6–8]). Under the linear
resource function (Equation [7]), no coexistence is expected
and novel strategies will replace existing strategies depending
on the invasion criteria (Equations [11] and [12]). Convex
resource utilization (the effects of the proportion of altruists
on resource consumption—Equation [8]) introduces addi-
tional ecological costs that lead to lower levels of resource
consumption (than the linear response) and hence inhibit
any potential for coexistence. In contrast, concave functions
(Equation [6]) lead to additional benefits of altruism (greater
than simple linear resource consumption) and increase the
potential for coexistence (Fig. 2).
Evolution of resource generalists
Substitutable resources
Invasion contours (Fig. 3) associated with the fitness condi-
tion (see Supporting information) for the evolution of gener-
alists on substitutable resources reveal that there is a threshold
level of altruism belowwhich generalism is favored (such that
there is no total preference for a single resource). Generalist
strategies are expected as altruismbecomes rarer. This thresh-
old level declines (altruism is more important in the evolu-
tion of specialism) as resource consumption rates increase
(β i). Hence, the region favoring the evolution of general-
ism is narrowed.More generally, both ecological (preferences
for resources, resource consumption rates) and evolutionary
(proportion of altruists) factors determine the evolution of
generalism under these resource conditions.
Complementary resources
Under complementary resources, invasion contours (Fig. 4)
associated with the fitness condition (see Supporting infor-
mation) show that as altruism increases and the level of re-
source consumption declines the evolution of generalism on
complementary resources is more likely. This occurs as each
strategy has an essential resource (which is a degree of spe-
cialization) that determines population growth and fitness
and hence the impact of the social behavior on the evolu-
tion of the strategy. Increases in the rate at which the ith
resource (which is the essential resource) is found (βki) in-
creases the evolution of generalism. Finally, there is an indi-
rect (ecological) effect between competitors for complemen-
tary resources that drives the patterns affecting the evolution
of generalism. While resource consumption of noncomple-
mentary resources does not contribute to population growth
of consumer, consumption does affect resource abundance.
For instance, the equilibrium abundance of a nonessential
resource is (for a two resource system—single consumer sys-
tem) is:
N∗2 = K2
(
1 − β2M
∗
r2
)
, (15)
whereM∗ is the equilibrium abundance of the consumer:
M∗ = r1
β1x
(
1 − N
∗
1
K1
)
, (16)
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Figure 2. Boundaries of coexistence (in terms of
resource consumption rates) for specialists
competing for a single resource under (a) linear
and (b) concave resource utilization response
curves (Equations [6–8]). Particular types of
cooperative interactions (concave responses)
broaden the regions of coexistence. Increasing
levels of resource consumption rates (β) is also
more likely to favor the coexistence of specialists.
(Shaded area denotes the region of coexistence).
Figure 3. Invasion contours for generalists to
evolve on substitutable resources. Generalists
are less likely to evolve when preference for a
resource is high and the proportion of altruists is
also high (which leads to resource specialism).
Increasing levels of resource consumption rates
(β) are also less likely to favor the evolution of
generalism.
Figure 4. Invasion contours for generalists to
evolve when feeding on complementary
resources. Generalists feeding on
complementary resources are more likely to
evolve (invade) as the proportion of cooperative
individuals increases. Increasing levels of
resource consumption rates (β) are also more
likely to promote the evolution of generalists.
which is affected by the density of the complementary re-
source N 1 (N1 = μq1β1x ). Alterations in the density of com-
plementary resources affect consumers with consequences
for noncomplementary resources and hence the evolution-
ary invasion of novel generalist strategies.
Discussion
The evolution of social behaviors is often explained by re-
latedness, the probability of encounter, reputation, and/or
local neighbor structure (Haldane 1955; Hamilton 1964a,b;
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Bourke 2011), where the benefits of the social behavior out-
weigh the costs of performing it. These sorts of explanations
have revolutionized our understanding of the occurrence of
altruism and have focused research attention on the exact
social and ecological conditions under which these sorts of
behaviors might be expected to evolve (e.g., Dugatkin 1997).
While it is appreciated that interactions among conspecific
individuals affect the resource acquisition, the potential to
affect resource–consumer interactions and the evolution of
resource specialism remains less clearly understood. Here, we
have shown how altruism can affect the evolution of resource
use. Using an evolutionary dynamic approach, we have eluci-
dated the conditions under which we might expect resource
generalism and specialism to evolve. In particular, we show
that a threshold condition exists below which resource spe-
cialism is not expected to evolve and that this threshold is
highly dependent on the payoffs received for adopting the
strategy (R in Equation [1]). Similarly, threshold conditions
on the level of cooperation determine when generalism is
expected: if resource preferences are weak and consumption
rates are low, generalists are expected to evolve.
Ecological dynamics are affected by the social behavior.
The evolution of generalism in the presence of complemen-
tary resources leads to an indirect ecological interaction. Pos-
itive changes in the density of complementary resources affect
consumers with negative consequences for noncomplemen-
tary resources (Equations [15] and [16]) and vice versa. The
availability of the essential limiting resource and the preva-
lence of cooperationwill have consequences for the evolution
of novel generalist strategies. This sort of indirect interaction
is an apparent competitive effect, where a consumer accesses
multiple shared resources (Holt 1977; Bonsall and Hassell
1997; Chaneton and Bonsall 2000) and the outcomes are
influenced not only by the resource–consumer interaction
but also by the level of altruism. The consequences of these
sorts of feedbacks between ecological and social interactions
warrant further attention.
Furthermore, patternsof coexistence are also likely tobe in-
fluenced by the degree of altruism.We explored this using dif-
ferent resource utilization functions (Equations [6–8]). The
linear relationship describing the response between resource
utilization and proportion of altruists within a population
can be thought of as a beneficial social behavioral strategy
(sensu Trivers 1985). The alternative functional responses
such as interactions, described by the concave function, lead
to a greater proportion of a resource being accessed for a
given level of altruism. The evolution of specialism might be
more likely when these sorts of social behaviors operate. In
contrast, competitive interactions diminish the returns from
altruistic interactions, limiting the potential for coexistence,
and promoting the evolution of generalism. Competition
can limit social interactions (Platt and Bever 2009) but this
crucially depends on population structure. Population-level
effects where the density dependence operates locally (Lev-
ene 1953; Dempster 1955; Karlin and Campbell 1981) and
resources are subdivided in a fine-grain environment (Levins
1962, 1968) are more likely to lead to strong competitive in-
teractions restricting coexistence and favoring the evolution
of generalists. However, this will be influenced by the timing
of density dependence with respect to other life-history ef-
fects (such as dispersal or heterospecific competition). Local
density-dependent processes will reduce individual fitness in
larger groups as per capita changes in population size will be
larger. If dispersal happens before density dependence then
the effects on fitness may be reduced and this will affect the
evolutionof specialismby affecting theproportionof altruists
in a population.
Resource partitioning is well established as a mechanism
by which multiple consumers can coexist (Miller 1967). The
availability of exclusive resource rights diminishes the de-
gree of interspecific competition and can favor coexistence.
This effect has been widely demonstrated in a diverse range
of taxa under different ecological scenarios (e.g., Dykhuizen
andDavies 1980; Hassell andMay 1986; Gherardi 1990; Bon-
sall et al. 2004a; Dammhahn and Kappeler 2008; Hunt and
Bonsall 2009). Competitive exclusion is also influenced by
the ecological dynamics of the resource–consumer interac-
tion (Armstrong andMcGehee 1980). Temporal fluctuations
in resources affect the (nonlinear) competitive coefficients
and promote coexistence as the average resource abundance
patterns are significantly different from the equilibrial re-
source level (Armstrong and McGehee 1980). Underpinning
this are alterations in the number of limiting processes af-
fecting patterns of coexistence (Levin 1970; May 1973). At
a broad mechanistic level, altruistic interactions are likely to
extend the factors limiting populations and promote coex-
istence (Fig. 4) but understanding more fully how resource
competition and social behavior drive resource cycles by in-
fluencing ecological limitation and regulation necessitates a
closer interplay between evolutionary game theory, ecological
dynamics, and experiments.
Variability in resource productivity will affect the degree
of competition and hence social interactions both of which
are clearly dependent on the spatial scale of interactions (e.g.,
Nowak and May 1992; Kelly 1994). Arguably, social inter-
actions are less likely when the scale of altruism equals or
exceeds the scale at which group-size regulation occurs (Tay-
lor 1992). However, the implications of these findings for the
evolution of resource specialism or generalism are not obvi-
ously clear as this will depend on how habitats are utilized.
More importantly, any environmental heterogeneity that af-
fects the predictability of resourceswill have consequences for
the population structures, local competition and cooperation
and, hence the evolution of specialism. If environments are
homogeneous and resources are predictable, it is anticipated
that this will promote a high level of cooperation leading to
c© 2012 The Authors. Ecology and Evolution published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 521
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resource specialization. Conversely, when environments are
heterogeneous and resources are more unpredictable, gen-
eralism will be expected. To some degree, these predictions
are borne out by empirical examples. Mixed resource uti-
lization by microorganisms is known to be dependent upon
their concentration (Harder and Dijkhuizen 1982). When
substrates are present in high concentrations that do not
limit growth then the resource that ensures highest growth
is preferentially utilized: specialism is favored. When mixed
resources are available that are growth limiting, simultaneous
use of multiple sources (generalism) is the expected response
(Harder and Dijkhuizen 1982). As far as we know as of yet,
there remain no empirical demonstrations of the role of al-
truistic behaviors driving resource specialism and generalism
but given this extensive information on mixed substrate uti-
lization it is clear that there are some extremely amenable
empirical systems for testing this hypothesis.
As noted, coexistence of multiple specialist strategies re-
quires life-history trade-offs. The evolutionary mechanisms
for this diversification and themaintenanceof diversity across
a resource require disruptive selection to maintain limiting
similarity (Bonsall et al. 2004b). These processes of diversi-
fication (through adaptive radiations; the emergence of eco-
logical diversity from a single lineage) provide evidence for
the evolution of resource specialism. For instance, the radia-
tion of Darwin’s Galapagos finches is the archetypal adaptive
radiation: the origin of new species of finch could only per-
sist if sufficiently distinct and adapted to different parts of
the niche hypervolume, restricting their ecology, and lead-
ing to specialization (Lack 1947; Grant 1986). More recently,
broader phylogenetic analysis (Schluter 2000) confirms this
sort of pattern of increasing specialization but also highlights
that it might not necessarily be universal. A key driver in
these adaptive radiations and driving resource specialization
is life-history trade-offs (Futuyma andMoreno 1988). Recent
work on adaptive radiations and resource specialization has
grown rapidly (Schluter 2000) particularly in microbial sys-
tems (Kassen and Rainey 2004;MacLean 2005). Evolutionary
trade-offshavebeen implicated inpatternsof resourceutiliza-
tion (Pfeiffer et al. 2001; Kreft andBonhoeffer 2005;MacLean
and Gudelj 2006; Gudelj et al. 2007) and social behaviors are
thought to affect certain trade-offs such as the link between
the rate and yield of adenosine triphosphate (ATP) produc-
tion. Pfeiffer et al. (2001) argue that high ATP production
rate but low yield may be selectively advantageous on shared
resources but social interactions in spatially structured en-
vironments can modulate this effect to favor low rate high
yield strategies. MacLean and Gudelj (2006) provide empir-
ical support for these theoretical predictions but the scale
of resource heterogeneity (in particular in structured envi-
ronments) may mask phenotypic trade-offs such as the link
between growth and competitive ability (Velicer and Lenski
1999). The genetic basis for the evolution of specialization
through trade-offs requires antagonistic pleiotropy (Elena
and Lenski 2003; Dykhuizen and Dean 2004). As noted, this
might bemanifest as a direct trade-off where performance on
one resource is negatively correlated with performance on a
second resource. Alternatively, pleiotropic effects might arise
through greater fitness increases on one resource compared
to that on a second resource. Further mechanisms that might
lead to the evolution of specialization include genetic drift,
evolutionary cataclysms, or the accumulation of mutations
(of different size effects) (Bidder 1930; Elena andLenski 2003;
Dykhuizen and Dean 2004). While these mechanisms do not
preclude selection for altruists, understanding the hierarchy
of mechanisms that facilitate the evolution of specialism and
generalism is amenable to further theoretical and empirical
analysis.
In summary, using an evolutionary dynamic approach
(linking evolutionary games to nonlinear ecological dynam-
ics), we have elucidated the conditions under whichwemight
expect resource generalism and specialism to evolve and be
maintained when altruism operates. Separating out the ori-
gins from the maintenance of traits is a critical dichotomy in
evolution that is too often conflated.Our approachbased on a
natural selection framework of the dynamics of a cost–benefit
interaction amongst altruists is an appropriateway to develop
predictions on the outcome of resource competition and spe-
cialization. Alternative approaches (often under limited sce-
narios of weak selection and additive cost–benefit effects)
may be appropriate for assessing the maintenance of social
behavioral traits butnoneof these canbe adequately extended
for exploring the ecological dynamical implications of trait
evolution. These caveats notwithstandingwe have shown that
threshold conditions in the levels of altruisms coupled with
resource–consumer interactions can be important drivers in
the evolution of specialism and generalism.
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